

## Appendix H

# ACTION NEEDED TO GAIN STRONGER GENDER EQUALITY ARCHITECTURE

### Current Situation

To date, there has been widespread support for strengthening the United Nations Gender Equality Architecture (GEA), as recommended in the report of the Coherence Panel, including from the new Secretary-General and the president of the General Assembly (GA). This is not the case for the entire report, called "Delivering as One." Yet, many member states are urging that the Panel report be considered as a whole, meaning that all of its recommendations be taken together. The result is that discussions about all the Panel's recommendations have been stalled since governments have differing opinions about each section. Therefore, women's groups are calling for the separation of the Gender Equality section as a separate issue that can be negotiated now, regardless of what happens with the other components of the report. It is crucial that this be done in order for action to be taken on the GEA before this session of the GA ends in August of 2007.

### Actions / Strategies

- » Lobby governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs (who are responsible for sending instructions to UN missions in New York) on the need not only to support the GEA proposal, but also to separate it out from the other recommendations of the Coherence Panel report.
- » Urge governments to liaise with their missions in New York and instruct them to affirm their support for the new proposal and for strengthening the existing GEA; governments should also encourage missions to engage in all relevant negotiations and to voice strong support within the country groups they are part of, e.g., G77, the EU, etc. This should be a matter of country priority.
- » Encourage governments to take positions on the GEA deliberations in *this* General Assembly session.
- » Inform governments that ideas to strengthen the GEA within the UN were conceived and supported by women's groups (and not donors) in order to deliver on the promises and commitments established in the Beijing Platform for Action over ten years ago – hence the recommendations contained in the report of the Coherence Panel are focused on creating a stronger, effective and well-resourced women's entity. This new entity will be responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of the integration of gender perspectives into the work of the United Nations system, including in top decision-making positions, as well as ensuring accountability and enforcement at the country level.
- » Use any upcoming regional meetings, intergovernmental conferences, etc., as an avenue to push the GEA agenda, including both to support the proposals and to separate them from the rest of the deliberations of the report.
- » Organize informal briefings with government officials throughout various regions.
- » Prepare a "GEA Kit" as an advocacy package (using press releases, endorsed papers, talking points, fact sheets, GEA Campaign statement, presentations, etc.).

### Where we are

The creation of this new women's entity is subject to the outcome of the intergovernmental process currently taking place in the GA in New York. In April, the Secretary-General, in his report to the GA, expressed his support for the Panel's recommendation to consolidate and strengthen the current structures into a single entity focused on gender equality and women's empowerment. The Deputy Secretary-General (DSG), Ms. Ashe Rose Migro, was asked to spearhead the implementation of the recommendations in this report.

The president of the General Assembly has been conducting extensive consultations with member states. She has expressed her support for strengthening the GEA and has urged governments to take action on the gender architecture recommendation. But the G77 and the "Non Aligned Movement" (NAM) continue to insist on an extensive debate on the entire report rather than negotiating within separate working groups on different sections. Thus, the relatively noncontroversial recommendations like strengthening the gender architecture are lumped together with all the other recommendations in the report, some of which are likely to be more controversial. Most of the discussions taking place are focused on process rather than the recommendations themselves. As a result, the process is currently stalled and the consultations continue, without any time frame for action.

### WE URGE YOU TO TAKE ACTION NOW!!

For more information please contact Charlotte Bunch at the Center for Women's Global Leadership ([cbunch@igc.org](mailto:cbunch@igc.org)) or June Zeitlin at WEDO ([june@wedo.org](mailto:june@wedo.org)). You can also go to the following websites: <http://www.wedo.org> or <http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu>.

## Appendix I

# UNITED NATIONS REFORM: HOW TO STRENGTHEN GENDER ARCHITECTURE?

The United Nations Non-governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), in collaboration with the Center for Women's Global Leadership (CWGL), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), organized a parallel event entitled "United Nations Reform: How to Strengthen Gender Architecture?" during the 51st session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).

The panel discussion was moderated by Ms. Barbara Adams, Chief, Strategic Partnerships and Communications, UNIFEM. Panelists included Ms. Elisa Peter, Deputy Coordinator of NGLS; Ms. Gita Sen, Professor, Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore, and Special Advisor to the UNIFEM Executive Director on Economic Security and Rights; Ms. Charlotte Bunch, Executive Director of CWGL; and Ms. Jean D'Cunha, UNIFEM's Regional Programme Director for East and South-East Asia.

Panelists summarized and discussed the recommendations from the Report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence issued in November 2006, "Delivering as One." The discussion focused on recommendations that relate to reforming the gender architecture at the United Nations and strengthening coherence between UN agencies in delivering at the country level that builds on the work of the UN Country Teams through the One UN pilot programs.

The panel discussion provided an opportunity to share experiences from Viet Nam, which is one of the eight pilot countries, Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uruguay, and to highlight the opportunities and challenges in promoting gender equality in this context. Panelists also described the successful role of NGOs in influencing the Panel to include recommendations on gender equality as a cross-cutting issue in the Panel report and the need to continue this engagement as Member States begin deliberations.

At the request of some of the audience members, a compilation of resources (UN and NGOs) available on UN reform and gender equality is provided below.

## United Nations Resources

### **Reform at the United Nations**

<http://www.un.org/reform/index.shtml>

### **High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence**

<http://www.un.org/events/panel/>

### **Delivering as One - Executive Summary**

[http://www.undg.org/docs/6879/coh\\_10\\_waysE.pdf](http://www.undg.org/docs/6879/coh_10_waysE.pdf)

### **Delivering as One - Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence** <http://www.un.org/events/panel/resources/pdfs/HLP-SWC-FinalReport.pdf>

Also available as document number A/61/583 at <http://documents.un.org/>

### **One UN Pilots / Joint Offices**

The "One UN" pilot initiative will test in eight countries how the UN family - with its many and diverse agencies - can deliver in a more coordinated way at the country level.

<http://www.undg.org/?P=7>

### **UN Secretary-General's report on "Delivering as One."**

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/621/41/PDF/N0662141.pdf?OpenElement>

## NGO Resources

### **Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) - UN Reform and the Gender Equality Recommendations**

[http://www.awid.org/go.php?pg=un\\_reform\\_recommendations](http://www.awid.org/go.php?pg=un_reform_recommendations)

### **Heinrich Böll Foundation and International Women's Tribune Centre (IWTC) - UN Reform - What's in it for Women?**

The publication from the Heinrich Böll Foundation and IWTC features reflections, insights and analysis by women from different regions, specifically examining the impact of the UN reform process on women at the regional and national levels. It also presents different initiatives and proposals in ensuring women's spaces within the UN as well as concrete recommendations on how to influence the UN reform process (August 2006).

[http://www.iwtc.org/reform\\_report.pdf](http://www.iwtc.org/reform_report.pdf)

### **NGO Linkage Caucus, convened by CWGL, WEDO and the NGO Committee on the Status of Women**

Open Letter regarding Women's/Gender Equality Architecture at the UN from the NGO Linkage Caucus taking part in the 51st Commission on the Status of Women

To: UN Member States and the Secretary-General

<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/ecosoc/CSW51/NGOdocs/CSW-LinkageCaucus.doc>

## NGO Statements

### **Africa: Statement of the African Feminist Forum on the New UN Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/GEAAFRICA.doc>

### **CEE: Concluding Statement of NGO Regional Consultation, Reforming the UN Gender Equality Architecture: What Does it Mean for Women's Rights in Europe and CIS?**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/GEACEE.doc>

Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)

<http://www.wedo.org/files/DAWN%20UNreformNov06.pdf>

### **Europe: UK Gender & Development Network & Women in Development**

#### **Europe Statement on Gender Equality Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on UN Reform**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/GEAEUROPE.pdf>

### **Latin American and the Caribbean: Statement of Caribbean Women Organizations and Women's Rights Advocates Delivered to the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Coherence Panel on UN Reform Regional Consultation for Latin America and the Caribbean**

[www.awid.org/un\\_reform/women\\_orgs\\_statement.pdf](http://www.awid.org/un_reform/women_orgs_statement.pdf)

### **South Asia: Statement on Reforming the Gender Equality Architecture of the United Nations**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/GEASOUTHASIA.doc>

## WEDO and CWGL

### **WEDO - "UN Reform: What's at Stake for Women?"**

WEDO's latest advocacy and activist resource on gender equality and UN Reform outlines the UN reform process and how it affects women's lives.

<http://www.wedo.org/files/UNreform+2.pdf>

### **WEDO - Talking Points: Women's Demands for UN Reform**

<http://www.wedo.org/files/TALKING%20POINTS.pdf>

### **WEDO - Gender Equality & United Nations Reform: A Resource Packet**

This packet includes talking points on gender equality and UN reform, women's groups statements and relevant news.

<http://www.wedo.org/files/UNReform-InfoPacket.pdf>

### **WEDO and CWGL: Statement on Reforming the Gender Equality Architecture of the United Nations, now signed by 157 organizations around the world**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/Statement11.09.06withsig.pdf>

### **September 2006: Briefing Note: Reforming the UN Gender Equality Architecture**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/BriefingNote0906.pdf>

**August 29, 2006: Fact Sheet on Reforming the Gender Architecture in the UN System, for consideration by the High-Level Panel on Coherence, Oslo Meeting**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/UNReformFactSheet0806.pdf>

**July 2, 2006: Gender Equality Architecture and UN Reforms, for submission to the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on System-Wide Coherence, by CWGL and WEDO, and prepared by Aruna Rao, Founder-Director, Gender at Work.**

**CWGL and WEDO Briefing Note issued after Consultation**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/CWGLWEDOBriefingNote.doc>

**Summary report of the High-Level Panel Consultation with Civil Society: Geneva, July 2, 2006**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/Coherence%20Panel%20Summary.pdf>

**May 8, 2006: Briefing Note on Women's Rights and the "Coherence Panel" in the UN Reform Process**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/UN%20Reform%20Briefing%20Note%20final.doc>

**Spanish**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/UN%20Reform%20Briefing%20Note%20SP.doc>

**French**

<http://www.cwgl.rutgers.edu/globalcenter/policy/unadvocacy/UN%20Reform%20Briefing%20Note%20FR.doc>

# The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction

**CAROL COHN WITH FELICITY HILL AND SARA RUDDICK**

**WMDC**

THE WEAPONS OF  
MASS DESTRUCTION  
COMMISSION

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[www.wmdcommission.org](http://www.wmdcommission.org)

This paper has been commissioned by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. Its purpose is to function as food-for-thought for the work of the Commission. The Commission is not responsible for views expressed in this paper.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC)**

The WMDC is an independent international commission initiated by the Swedish Government on a proposal from the United Nations. Its task is to present proposals aimed at the greatest possible reduction of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, including both short-term and long-term approaches and both non-proliferation and disarmament aspects. The Commission will issue its report in early 2006.

The commissioners serve in their personal capacity. The Commission is supported by a Secretariat based in Stockholm, Sweden.

**Members of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission**

Hans Blix, Chairman (Sweden)  
Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia)  
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This paper is an adaptation of material presented by Dr. Carol Cohn and Felicity Hill to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission on 12 June 2005, incorporating ideas and comments raised during the session. The authors are most grateful to the members of the Commission for a thoughtful and stimulating discussion and to the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Swedish Section) for support that enabled Dr. Cohn's visit. The authors would also like to thank Rebecca Johnson for her thoughtful editing and contributions to this paper.

When trying to think about how to solve the problems created by the existence of weapons of mass destruction, ideas about gender matter. Although the linkage between weapons of mass destruction and gender will be unfamiliar for many readers, this paper<sup>i</sup> argues that ideas and expectations about gender are woven through the professional and political discourses that shape all aspects of how weapons of mass destruction are considered, desired and addressed. To address WMD challenges more effectively, it is essential to take into consideration how armament and disarmament policies and practices are influenced by ideas about masculinity. An understanding of how these limitations occur can play a crucial role in helping break some of the persistent barriers to achieving disarmament and non-proliferation.

It is important to stress that this paper will focus on ideas about gender, rather than on men or women *per se*. A different paper will need to be written that would look at men's and women's relations to WMD. That paper would explore the implications of the fact that women have been largely absent from the scientific and political decisionmaking about WMD,<sup>ii</sup> in spite of the long and consistent history of women's organisations advocating for the total disarmament of biological, chemical and particularly nuclear weapons.<sup>iii</sup> It might also look at some of the different ways that men's and women's bodies are affected by the development and testing of these weapons.<sup>iv</sup> The present article, however, does not focus on women's or men's bodies, nor their political perspectives or activism; instead it will focus on how ideas about gender – what is masculine or feminine, powerful or impotent – affect our efforts towards halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and bringing about effective disarmament.

## Defining Gender

Before proceeding with the argument, we need to look at the oft misused and misunderstood term “gender” and clarify its multiple meanings and our use of it. “Gender” has increasingly been employed to make a distinction between biology and culture – that is, the biological differences between male and female bodies on the one hand, and the *meaning* given to those differences on the other. People in every culture have biologically male or female bodies, but what it means to be “masculine” or “feminine” is different for different cultures and changes over time. What kinds of capabilities or personality traits we expect women or men to have, the kinds of activities, jobs, and family roles we think it appropriate for them to take on, what it means to be a “real man” or a “good woman” – all of these are part of the cultural meaning given to biological difference.

Gender is not only about individual identity or what a society teaches us a man or woman, boy or girl should be like. Gender is also a way of structuring relations of power – whether that is within families, where the man is often considered the head of the household, or in societies writ large, where men tend to be the ones in whose hands political, economic, religious and other forms of cultural power are concentrated.

These two phenomena – individual identity and structures of power – are significantly related to each other. Hence it is the meanings and characteristics culturally associated with masculinity

that make it appear “natural” and just for men to have the power to govern their families and their societies. That is, if as a society we come to believe that people with biologically male bodies are the ones most likely to be strong, rational, prudent, responsible, objective, and willing to fight if necessary (*also known as* “masculine”), we will think it right that they are the ones to rule. Conversely, if as a society we come to believe that people with female bodies are weak, emotional, irrational, passive, nurturing, and in need of protection (*also known as* “feminine”), we will think it natural and right that most women’s lives should be limited to the private sphere of home and family.

A next crucial step in thinking about gender is to realise that its effects go beyond the meanings ascribed to male and female bodies, and the concomitant ways that power is (unequally) distributed amongst men and women. Gender also functions as a symbolic system: our ideas about gender permeate and shape our ideas about many other aspects of society beyond male-female relations – including politics, weapons, and warfare.

Male	Female
Thought	Emotion
Active	Passive
Rational	Irrational
Strength	Weakness
Mind	Body
Courage	Fear
Intelligence	Cunning
Self	Other
Primary	Secondary
Serious	Playful
Concrete	Abstract
Doer	Done
Reality	Appearance
Science	Humanities
Philosophy	Myth
Order	Disorder
Permanent	Ephemeral
Dominate	Subordinate
Confident	Fearful
Simplicity	Complexity
Truth	Fiction
Classical	Romantic
Centre	Margin
Master	Slave
Teacher	Student

The easiest way to see this is to look at some of the adjectives associated with masculinity (e.g., strong, rational, prudent, active, objective) and femininity (e.g., weak, irrational, impulsive, passive, subjective). What is immediately apparent is:

- first, they constitute dichotomous pairs of characteristics which are seen as mutually exclusive (e.g., strong/weak, active/passive, etc.);
- second, in each case, the “masculine” side of the pair is valued more highly than the “feminine” one.
- third, the very meaning of masculinity and femininity is defined through its relation to its “opposite”. That is, they are dependent upon each other for their meaning: masculinities do not exist except in contrast to femininities and vice versa. This means that a man could not be seen as insufficiently masculine or “wimpy” unless we have an idea of the “feminine” characteristics “real” men must avoid.

Critically, this creation of gender-dichotomised pairings extends far beyond a list of human characteristics: think, for example, of culture/nature; analysis/intuition; order/disorder; assert/compromise; military/civilian. Here, too, although these pairs have no necessary relation to male or female bodies, in US (the dominant Western) culture, one side of each pair is culturally coded “masculine”, the other “feminine”, and the “masculine is the more highly valued. The effect of this symbolic gender-coding is that any human action or endeavour, no matter how unrelated to biological maleness or femaleness, is perceived as more or less masculine or feminine – even if only at a subconscious level – and valued or devalued accordingly. In other words, ideas about gender not only shape how we perceive men and women; they shape how we see the world. And they have political effects.

### **Gender, National Security and Weapons**

Weapons of mass destruction are not only physical objects, they are political objects; their symbolic importance is key in national and international security debates, as well as in domestic politics. And one aspect of political discourse – so obvious as to be usually taken for granted – is that gendered terms and symbols are an integral part of how political issues are thought about and represented, and an integral part of the image-production associated with political leaders. There is often, for instance, an anxious preoccupation with affirming manhood on the part of candidates for political office, for whom it is dangerous to be seen as “soft” or “wimpish”: recent US politics provides the example of the fevered Republican efforts to undermine presidential candidate John Kerry’s image as a leader by undermining his portrayal as a courageous warrior in Vietnam; or the pre-election spectacle of President George W. Bush striding across the deck of an aircraft carrier in his flight suit, proclaiming victory in Iraq in front of a “mission accomplished” banner.<sup>v</sup>

There are also many instances in which political masculinity is linked with preparedness to use military action and to wield weapons. During the first Bush administration 1988-1992, for example, the US media speculated whether George H. W. Bush had finally “beat the wimp factor” by going to war against Iraq. In these and other cases, we see the link between war and a heroic kind of masculinity, which depends on a feminised and devalued notion of peace as unattainable, unrealistic, passive and (it might be said) undesirable.

But it is not only the political context within which weapons of mass destruction are situated that is deeply gendered. So are the practical and symbolic dimensions of weapons themselves. This is perhaps most obvious in relation to small arms. Governments and international institutions are increasingly accepting that small arms and light weapons (SALW) are practically associated with masculinity in many cultures, with men as the vast majority of the buyers, owners or users. After early policy failures, it is also becoming increasingly recognised that the symbolic associations of SALW with masculinity have political effects. Specifically, in relation to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes, real barriers to effective SALW disarmament are created by the ways in which masculine identities and roles have become conjoined with weapons possession for many (male) combatants.

There is now general recognition that there are significant gender dimensions to the possession of small arms and light weapons. It would be naive to assume that this association suddenly becomes meaningless when we are talking about larger, more massively destructive weapons. And more naïve still to think that it doesn’t matter. Given the dubious military value and problematic usability of most WMD, a focus on their symbolic dimensions has to be central to any effort at weapons reduction or disarmament. Without gender analysis, attempts to untangle and understand the symbolic value and meaning of WMD are incomplete and inadequate.

Some brief examples illustrate this important dimension. When India exploded five nuclear devices in May 1998, Hindu nationalist leader Balasaheb Thackeray explained “we had to prove that we are not eunuchs”. An Indian newspaper cartoon depicted Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee propping up his coalition government with a nuclear bomb. “Made with Viagra”

the caption read. Images such as these rely on the widespread metaphoric equation of political and military power with sexual potency and masculinity. Political actors incorporate sexual metaphors in their representations of nuclear weapons as a way to mobilise gendered associations and symbols in creating assent, excitement, support for, and identification with the weapons and their own political regime; in other words, the symbolic gendered dimensions of nuclear weapons are not trivial; they are an integral part of accomplishing domestic and political objectives.

That a nation wishing to stake a claim to being a regional or world power should choose nuclear weapons as its medium for doing so is too frequently characterised as “natural”: advanced military destructive capacity identifies a state as powerful. The “fact” that nuclear weapons are being instituted as the currency for establishing a hierarchy of state power is unremarked, unanalysed, and taken for granted by most analysts. By contrast, feminist theory, using a historical and post-colonial lens, is better able to understand nuclear weapons’ enshrinement as the emblem of power not as a natural fact, but as a social one, produced by the actions of states. Thus, when the United States, with the most powerful economy and conventional military in the world, acts as though its power and security are guaranteed only by a large nuclear arsenal, it creates a context in which nuclear weapons become the ultimate necessity for, and symbol of, state security. And when the United States (or any other nuclear power) works hard to ensure that other countries don’t obtain nuclear weapons, it is creating a context in which it is perceived as keeping other nations down, to subordinate and emasculate them – to render them eunuchs! Hence, regardless of their military utility nuclear weapons are turned into the ultimate arbiter of political/masculine power. Balasaheb Thackeray did not invent the meaning of India’s nuclear tests out of thin air.

### **Why do ideas about gender matter for dealing with WMD?**

The ways in which ideas about gender are embedded in ideas about WMD matter for two central reasons. Firstly, ideas about gender serve to shape, limit and distort the very discourses – both professional and political – that have been developed to think about WMD, and so have political consequences that have a crucial bearing on our efforts to try to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation. Secondly, ideas about gender also shape, limit and distort the national and international political processes through which decisions about WMD are made. Ideas about strength, protection, rationality, security and control have a critical impact on governmental and intergovernmental policy, as well as functioning at a large-scale societal level, where a certain notion of aggressive masculinity is equated with human nature, as in the phrase “disarmament would be nice but it’s against human nature”. We must be aware of, and find ways to address, these gendered assumptions if we are to transform the intellectual and political processes that have so long impeded effective WMD disarmament.

### ***Ideas about gender shape, limit and distort professional and political discourses about WMD***

We start with a true story, told to Dr. Cohn by a member of a group of nuclear strategists, a white male physicist:

“Several colleagues and I were working on modelling counterforce nuclear attacks, trying to get realistic estimates of the number of immediate fatalities that would result from different deployments. At one point, we re-modelled a particular attack, using slightly different assumptions, and found that instead of there being 36 million immediate fatalities, there would only be 30 million. And everybody was sitting around nodding, saying, ‘Oh yes, that’s great, only 30 million,’ when all of a sudden, I *heard* what we were saying. And I blurted out, ‘Wait, I’ve just heard how we’re talking – *Only* 30 million! *Only* 30 million human beings killed instantly?’ Silence fell upon the room. Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.” The physicist added that henceforth he was careful never to blurt out anything like that again.

Why did he feel that way? First, he was transgressing a code of professional conduct. Expressing concern about human bodies is not the way you talk within the terms of the strategic expert discourse, which is, after all, a discourse about weapons and their relation to each other, not to human bodies. But even worse than that, he evinced some of the characteristics on the “female” side of the dichotomies – in his “blurting” he was being impulsive, uncontrolled, emotional, concrete, upset and attentive to fragile human bodies. Thus, the hegemonic discourse of gender positioned him as feminine, which he found doubly threatening. It was not only a threat to his own sense of self as masculine, his gender identity; it also positioned him in the devalued or subordinate position in the discourse. Thus, both his statement, “I felt like a woman,” and his subsequent silence in that and other settings, are completely understandable. To find the strength of character and courage to transgress the strictures of both professional and gender codes and to associate yourself with a lower status is very difficult.

This story is not simply about one individual, his feelings and actions; it illustrates the role and meaning of gender discourse in the defence community. The impact of gender discourse in that room (and countless others like it) is that some things are excluded and get left out from professional deliberations. Certain ideas, concerns, interests, information, feelings and meanings are marked in national security discourse as feminine, and devalued. They are therefore very difficult to speak, as exemplified by the physicist who blurted them out and wished he hadn’t. And if they manage to be said, they are also very difficult to hear, to take in and work with seriously. For the others in the room, the way in which the physicist’s comments were marked as feminine and devalued served to delegitimize them; it also made it very unlikely that any of his colleagues would find the courage to agree with him.

This example should not be dismissed as just the product of the idiosyncratic personal composition of that particular room; it is replicated many times and in many places. Women, in professional and military settings, have related experiences of realising that something terribly important is being left out but feeling constrained, as if there is almost a physical barrier preventing them from pushing their transgressive truths out into the open.

What is it that cannot be spoken? First, any expression of an emotional awareness of the desperate human reality behind the sanitised abstractions of death and destruction in strategic deliberations. Similarly, weapons’ effects may only be spoken of in the most clinical and abstract terms, and usually only by those deemed to have the appropriate professional qualifications and expertise.

What gets left out, then, is the emotional, the concrete, the particular, human bodies and their vulnerability, human lives and their subjectivity – all of which are marked as feminine in the binary dichotomies of gender discourse. In other words, gender discourse informs and shapes nuclear and national security discourse, and in so doing creates silences and absences. It keeps things out of the room, unsaid, and keeps them ignored if they manage to get in. As such, it degrades our ability to think well and fully about nuclear weapons and national security, and so shapes and limits the possible outcomes of our deliberations.

With this understanding, it becomes obvious that defence intellectuals’ standards of what constitutes “good thinking” about weapons and security have not simply evolved out of trial and error; it is not that the history of nuclear discourse has been filled with exploration of other ideas, concerns, interests, information, questions, feelings, meanings and stances which were then found to create distorted or poor thought. On the contrary, serious consideration of a whole range of ideas and options has been preempted by their gender coding, and by the feelings evoked by living up to or transgressing normative gender ideals. To borrow a strategists’ term, we can say that gender coding serves as a “preemptive deterrent” to certain kinds of thought about the effects and consequences of strategic plans and WMD.<sup>vi</sup>

***Ideas about gender shape, limit and distort the national and international political processes through which decisions about WMD are made***

The impact of ideas about gender extends beyond the realm of the professional discourse of weapons experts; ideas about gender also affect the national and international processes through which decisions are made about the acquisition of weapons, the maintenance of weapons stockpiles, and disarmament initiatives. To see this, we need to treat seriously a phenomenon that is so taken for granted that it is usually unremarked – that both war and weapons are currently associated with masculinity. What does it mean to take this seriously? What effects does this have?

One telling example comes from 1990, after Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait, during the build-up to the first Gulf War. During a speculative discussion among a group of defence intellectuals and opinion-formers, one declared, “Look, the question is, “Does George [H.W.] Bush have the stones for war?” That is, does he have the masculine strength and courage, is he man enough, to lead his country into war?<sup>vii</sup>

Look at what happens when the question is framed this way. Even though the man who asked this question might not endorse the statement “war is a good thing”, he equated a willingness to go to war with having “stones” – a euphemism for balls, generally regarded as a positive attribute (for a man). Hence “going to war” is given the positive valence that masculinity – being a “real man” – is understood to possess. Even more importantly, this equation carries a deeper implication: not only does it give to waging war some of the positive value attached to masculinity; it also makes it much more difficult not to go to war.

By extension, the research, development, production, stockpiling and deployment of weapons and delivery systems – without which going to war is impossible – are also equated with manliness, using gender-resonant language about the importance of “demonstrating our strength and resolve”. As a consequence, it is easier to delegitimise proponents of cutting military spending. Whether their motivations are disarmament or getting rid of expensive weapons programmes that make no military or strategic sense, opponents of military spending are undermined by accusations of being “weak on defence”. They are portrayed as feeble, wimpy or lacking “balls” – the kiss of death in American politics.

Another example, from US public discourse after 9/11, is some variation on the theme, “We should bomb `em back to the Stone Age, and then make the rubble bounce.”<sup>viii</sup> Frequently expressed on talk radio shows or internet discussions, this kind of rhetoric hardly represents a rational strategic calculation; rather, it is about the sheer pleasure and thrill of having so much destructive power. While astounding in its amorality and ignorance, such utterances are meant to elicit admiration for the wrathful manliness of the speaker. The effects of this kind of speech are pernicious. The implication is that to avoid responding to a political crisis by going to war shows a lack of balls. Not to be ready, willing and able to demolish your opponents by “bombing `em back to the Stone Age” is to be weak. In such a charged and masculinised context, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to develop and advocate other forms of security policy.

By correlation, although the practice of diplomacy is also ritualised and masculinised in many ways, US culture has never accorded diplomacy the strong, muscular attributes that are heaped on soldiering. US movies are not filled with brawny movie stars playing heroes in the diplomatic corps. Manly action heroes seldom carry briefcases (unless they are undercover James Bonds). Nor do they, in the cultural meanings of masculinity dominant in the United States, make treaties and “depend” on the other parties to honour their obligations under those treaties. This point was acutely represented in a recent political cartoon in a US newspaper that featured the earth as a jigsaw puzzle with one piece missing from the centre. President George W. Bush was depicted walking away with that piece under his arm saying, “treaties are for wimps”.

In other words, consulting, negotiating, acknowledging interdependence and – worst of all – depending on others, are activities that are culturally marked down as weak and lacking in masculinity. In the US cultural and symbolic system, trying to get what you want by talking and

persuading, depending, trusting and compromising is feminine; having the power to enforce your will is much more masculine.

The use of inspections rather than military attack, as the means to ensure that a state does not build and deploy weapons of mass destruction, would be another example of a culturally feminised approach to achieve the political objective of non-proliferation. Living in the United States during the build up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the symbolic gendered overtones of the difference between responding to a “bully” with inspections or military action was enormously significant, especially for mobilising political support. Despite the actual, and now proven, effectiveness of the United Nations’ UNSCOM, UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and disarmament regimes in Iraq during the 1990s, the route of inspections was belittled as ineffectual, wimpy, and insufficiently active and aggressive; critically, it was portrayed as simply not a powerful enough way to respond to the perceived threat of a “rogue actor”. On the contrary, a massive military campaign in which the United States would “smoke `em out of their holes and their WMD with them” was presented as a far more powerful and satisfying way to deal with the problem.<sup>ix</sup> A decade of inspections was portrayed as having been impotent – the worst form of demasculinisation. In contrast, it was taken for granted, at least by agenda setting leaders and most of the US media, that the only real way to deal was to have the enemy at the other end of the barrel of a gun. The way in which gender associations were intertwined with these two different approaches facilitated the selling of war as the right policy - and made it difficult to argue for further inspections.

The fact that the inspections regime worked was lost in this masculinised landscape. That this important recognition is still largely invisible to Americans, if not to the rest of the world, is even greater testament to the power of ideas about gender and the way gendered meanings are attached to all kinds of activities and discourses. In short, the gender-coding of “passive, wimpy” inspections creates a political “reality” in which it doesn’t matter that the inspections worked. Despite their success, inspections are identified as weak and ineffectual, an inappropriate tool for the most muscular nation on earth.

That invasion should “self-evidently” seem to be a more potent, effective course of action than inspection is connected to another gendered phenomenon: the efficacy of violence is consistently over-estimated, while its costs are undercounted.<sup>x</sup> The corollary of this is that the efficacy of nonviolent means is consistently underestimated, and its costs exaggerated. This sleight of hand cannot be understood without comprehending the impact of ideas about gender. The context in which the IAEA and its inspections partners in Iraq, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, had to work was one in which multilateralism and treaties were seen as weak, temporary alternatives to national (militarised) action. This constructed perception of treaties as feeble and effeminate routes to security is an enormous obstacle that advocates of disarmament and human security have to struggle through, no matter how credible or rational their case may be.

### **Gender and Proliferation<sup>xi</sup>**

“Proliferation” is not a mere description or mirror of a phenomenon that is “out there” but rather a very specific way of identifying and constructing a problem concerning weapons. Proliferation, as used in Western political discourse, does not simply refer to the “multiplication” of weapons of mass destruction on the planet. Rather, it constructs some WMD as a problem, and turns a blind eye to others. With nuclear weapons, for example, it is able to do this by assuming pre-existing, legitimate possessors, implicitly not only entitled to those weapons, but to modernise and develop new generations of them as well. The “problematic” nuclear weapons are only those that “spread” into the arsenals of other, formerly non-possessor states. This is the basis for the “licit/illicit” distinction commonly found in arms control discourse, which does not refer to the nature of the weapons themselves, nor even to the purposes for which they are intended, but on who possesses them. The nuclear non-proliferation regime enshrined “we got there first” as a basis for arms control.

Most people in the world view WMD as intrinsically morally indefensible, no matter who possesses them. In addition to the abhorrence attached to their use, the wide array of social, economic, political and health costs associated with their development and deployment are repugnant. Rejecting proliferation discourse's implicit division of "good" and "bad," "safe" and "unsafe" WMD, (defined as such depending on who possesses them), it is imperative now to understand how some WMD are rendered invisible or benign (ours) and others visible and malignant (theirs).

In drawing a distinction between "the Self" and the (generally non-Western) "Unruly Other", the prevailing arguments against proliferation appear patronising, ethno-racist and contemptuous. Not only does non-proliferation discourse draw on Occidentalist portrayals of third world actors; it does so through the medium of gender-laden terminology. For example, the nuclear possessors' Self is responsible, prudent, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically and bureaucratically competent (and thus "hegemonically masculine"). By contrast, the Unruly Others are irrational, unpredictable, emotional, uncontrolled, immature, primitive, undisciplined, incompetent, technologically backward (marks of an inferior or "subordinated" masculinity). Hence the terms of the debate are constructed to normalise and legitimate the Self/possessor states keeping weapons that the Others must be prevented from acquiring. By drawing on and evoking gendered imagery and resonances, the discourse naturalises the idea that "We" (the responsible father or sheriff) must protect, control and limit the "uncivilised", out-of control "rogue" states – for their own good, as well as for ours.

This Western proliferation discourse has had a function in the wider context of US national security politics. With the end of the "Evil Empire" of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, until the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States appeared to be without an enemy sufficiently threatening to justify maintaining its sprawling military-industrial establishment. This difficulty for the military-industrial complex was forestalled by the construction of the category of "rogue states", with governments portrayed as uncontrollable, irresponsible, irrational, malevolent, and antagonistic to Western values. Their unruliness and hostility is represented as intrinsic to their irrational nature, for to view the antagonism as politically rooted would have necessitated some soul-searching analysis into the role of Western policies and actions in contributing to disorder and breakdown in other states and regions.

The discourse of WMD proliferation has been one of the principal means of portraying certain states as major threats. To say this is neither to back away from our position opposing all weapons of mass destruction, nor to argue about the degree to which WMD in the hands of "Other" states actually do threaten the United States, local populations, regional neighbours or international security. The point is that the underlying gendered symbolism in the WMD proliferation discourse helps make it feel natural and legitimate to fight wars and spend money on military programmes such as ballistic missile defence, which would otherwise be difficult to justify on rational security grounds.

### **Resolution 1325: enhancing the role of women in peace and security**

What do you get from being aware of the gendered meanings that are woven through WMD discourse and politics? First, ignoring it doesn't make it go away. Instead, by recognising that there is a problem, it becomes possible to confront the traditionally constructed meanings and redefine terms such as "strength" and "security" so that they more appropriately reflect the needs of all people. Highlighting the ways in which the notions of militarised security are silently underwritten and supported by an image of hegemonic masculinity enable us to see just how dangerous and illusory an image of security that produces.

Gender awareness also shows that participating in self-censorship, as the physicist in the first example did, is understandable, but very counter-productive. The effect of such self-censorship is to exclude a whole range of relevant inputs as if they did not belong in discussions of "hard" security issues because they are too "soft" (i.e. feminine).

The growing and active community working around gender, peace and security issues can very effectively multiply, amplify and deepen arguments for disarmament, which is the most effective nonproliferation approach of all, as recognised for biological and chemical weapons. Concurrently, as a consequence of the unanimous adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, foreign ministries and departments of defence are having to pay more attention to gender issues.<sup>xii</sup> This resolution has attracted more interest than many other Security Council resolutions, forging new networks, publications, organisations, initiatives and budgets, as an active global constituency develops to further the resolution's aims and monitor implementation. By placing gender within the UN's mandate of maintaining international peace and security, UNSCR 1325 provides legitimacy for work on raising gender awareness in all aspects of security and defence.

The debate on that resolution and its follow up have brought into sharper focus the enormous contribution of women as stakeholders in peace, disarmament and conflict prevention. The role of men and a certain kind of masculinity in dominating the political structures that organise wars and oversee security matters is beginning to be questioned. The result has been a greater awareness of the gender dimensions of security issues in conflict and post-conflict situations throughout the international community. Even NATO is convening workshops on the significance of UNSCR 1325 to its work!

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## **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY**

*Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) is the first resolution ever passed by the Security Council that specifically addresses the impact of war on women, and women's contributions to conflict resolution and sustainable peace. It was passed unanimously on 31 October 2000.*

### **The Security Council,**

**Recalling** its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President and recalling also the statement of its President, to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

**Recalling** also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General

Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the twenty-first century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

**Bearing** in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

**Expressing** concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

**Reaffirming** the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

**Reaffirming** also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

**Emphasizing** the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

**Recognizing** the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

**Recognizing** also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

**Recognizing** that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

**Noting** the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1. **Urges** Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2. **Encourages** the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3. **Urges** the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. **Further** urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. **Expresses** its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. **Requests** the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. **Urges** Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. **Calls** on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia: (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect

for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9. ***Calls*** upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention Security Council - 5 - Press Release SC/6942 4213th Meeting (PM) 31 October 2000 on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10. ***Calls*** on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. ***Emphasizes*** the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls, and in this regard, stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. ***Calls*** upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolution 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998;

13. ***Encourages*** all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. ***Reaffirms*** its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15. ***Expresses*** its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16. ***Invites*** the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. ***Requests*** the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council, progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. ***Decides*** to remain actively seized of the matter.

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## Notes

<sup>i</sup> This paper is based on a presentation made by Carol Cohn and Felicity Hill to the WMD Commission in Stockholm, June 2005.

<sup>ii</sup> The ratio of women to men is extremely imbalanced in security and disarmament negotiations, which is increasingly considered relevant. In the ten years between 1992 and 2002, 33 women headed delegations to the review meetings of the NPT, compared to 660 men in that role. During the same period at the General Assembly First Committee on Security and Disarmament, women headed only 7% of country delegations. Out of 88 ambassadors in the Security Council between 1992 and 2005, only 4 have been women.

<sup>iii</sup> Women's organisations have protested nuclear weapons since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and have campaigned for cessation of nuclear testing. When women activists collected baby teeth and had them tested for levels of strontium 90, it had a strong impact on public debate on nuclear issues in the USA. Women anti-nuclear activists have successfully closed nuclear weapons bases, such as the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp in the United Kingdom, and engaged in concerted efforts that forced governments to change policies or create nuclear-weapon-free zones at the municipal level throughout the world. They have also monitored and lobbied international meetings on disarmament, such as the General Assembly's three Special Sessions on Disarmament, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the First Committee of the General Assembly on Disarmament and International Security. The World Conferences on Women in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1995 all mentioned disarmament and macro security issues because of strong advocacy on the part of women's organisations making linkages between gender issues and weapons issues, with the Beijing Declaration recognising 'the leading role that women have played in the peace movement, work[ing] actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and support[ing] negotiations on the conclusion, without delay, of a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which contributes to nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects'.

<sup>iv</sup> Scientists and researchers have found that women are more at risk of developing fatal cancer than men when exposed to the same ionising radiation exposure. Women's reproductive health is especially susceptible to the effects of radiation released from nuclear testing, as a National Cancer Institute study has documented, radioactive isotopes from nuclear testing have been found in every single county of the US. Pacific Island women who lived "downwind" from nuclear testing had high rates of still births and some babies born without bones or with other severe deformities such as transparent skin or displaced organs.

<sup>v</sup> Though this rugged masculine image was convincing for many voters, its obvious construction for PR purposes laid it open to being lampooned, as illustrated by a cartoonist who portrayed Bush on that occasion as suffering from "premature ejaculation."

<sup>vi</sup> For a more in-depth and multi-faceted development of the argument that ideas about gender have the effect of limiting and distorting the very discourses – both professional and political – that have been developed to think about WMD see Carol Cohn, 'Slick'ems, glick'ems, Christmas Trees, and Cookie Cutters: Nuclear Language and How We Learned to Pat the Bomb', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June, Volume 43., 'Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals', *Signs*, vol.12, No. 4, 1989, pp. 687-718, 'Wars, Wimps and Women' in Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott, (1993), *Gendering War Talk*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (from which this example is drawn).

<sup>vii</sup> This example comes from a meeting of civilian defence intellectuals, at which Carol Cohn was present as a participant observer.

<sup>viii</sup> "Bomb 'em back to the Stone Age" is a phrase from Air Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, whose idea of how the US should employ its nuclear weapons in the height of the Cold War did not exactly conform to the subtleties and complexities of the nuclear strategists of his time. The phrase is now commonly used, along with "make the rubble bounce," by a wide range of commentators on warfare, as a 'google' search will quickly reveal.

<sup>ix</sup> "We will find those who did it, we will smoke 'em out of their holes, we will get them running, and we will bring them to justice" was President George W. Bush's response to the bombing of the World Trade Centers in New York on September 11, 2001, <http://www.npr.org/news/specials/tradecenter/tradecenter.html>

<sup>x</sup> Carol Cohn and Sally Ruddick, "A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction", in *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives*, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi & Steven P. Lee, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

<sup>xi</sup> This section of the paper is taken from Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick, op. cit.

<sup>xii</sup> In March 2000, the Security Council conceded that 'peace was inextricably tied to equality between women and men,' (see: "Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality between Women and Men says Security Council, in International Women's Day Statement", *Security Council press release SC/6816*, 8 March 2000 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/news/articles/chowdhurywd00.htm>) and in October 2000 unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, S/Res/1325 (2000), <http://www.un.org/>.

## List of published studies and papers

All papers and studies are available as pdf-files at the Commission's website: [www.wmdcommission.org](http://www.wmdcommission.org)

- No 1** "Review of Recent Literature on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation" by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2004
- No 2** "Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism" by Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, June 2004
- No 3** "The Nuclear Landscape in 2004: Past Present and Future" by John Simpson, June 2004
- No 4** "Reviving the Non-Proliferation Regime" by Jonathan Dean, June 2004
- No 5** "Article IV of the NPT: Background, Problems, Some Prospects" by Lawrence Scheinman, June 2004
- No 6** "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Still a Useful Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Tool?" by Scott Parrish and Jean du Preez, June 2004
- No 7** "Making the Non-Proliferation Regime Universal" by Sverre Lodgaard, June 2004
- No 8** "Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons" by William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, June 2004
- No 9** "The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes: Is It Still Relevant?" by Jean du Preez, June 2004
- No 10** "A Global Assessment of Nuclear Proliferation Threats" by Joseph Cirincione, June 2004
- No 11** "Assessing Proposals on the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle" by Jon B. Wolfsthal, June 2004
- No 12** "The New Proliferation Game" by William C Potter, June 2004
- No 13** "Needed: a Comprehensive Framework for Eliminating WMD" by Michael Krepon, September 2004
- No 14** "Managing the Biological Weapons Problem: From the Individual to the International" by Jez Littlewood, August 2004
- No 15** "Coping with the Possibility of Terrorist Use of WMD" by Jonathan Dean, June 2004
- No 16** "Comparison of States vs. Non-State Actors in the Development of a BTW Capability" by Åke Sellström and Anders Norqvist, October 2004
- No 17** "Deinflating 'WMD'" by George Perkovich, October 2004
- No 18** "Global Governance of 'Contentious' Science: The Case of the World Health Organization's Oversight of Small Pox Virus Research" by Jonathan B. Tucker and Stacy M. Okutani, October 2004
- No 19** "WMD Verification and Compliance: The State of Play" submitted by Foreign Affairs Canada and prepared by Vertic, October 2004
- No 20** "WMD Verification and Compliance: Challenges and Responses" submitted by Foreign Affairs Canada, October 2004
- No 21** "Meeting Iran's Nuclear Challenge" by Gary Samore, October 2004
- No 22** "Bioterrorism and Threat Assessment" by Gary A. Ackerman and Kevin S. Moran, November 2004
- No 23** "Enhancing BWC Implementation: A Modular Approach" by Trevor Findlay and Angela Woodward, December 2004
- No 24** "Controlling Missiles", by Jonathan Dean, December 2004
- No 25** "On Not Confusing the Unfamiliar with the Improbable: Low-Technology Means of Delivering Weapons of Mass Destruction" by Dennis M. Gormley, December 2004
- No 26** "A Verification and Transparency Concept for Technology Transfers under the BTWC" by Jean Pascal Zanders, February 2005
- No 27** "Missing Piece and Gordian Knot: Missile Non-Proliferation" by Mark Smith, February 2005
- No 28** "The Central Importance of Legally Binding Measures for the Strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)" by Graham S. Pearson, February 2005
- No 29** "Russia in the PSI: The Modalities of Russian Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative" by Alexandre Kaliadine, August 2005
- No 30** "Indicators of State and Non-State Offensive Chemical and Biological Programmes" edited by Ingrid Fångmark and Lena Norlander, August 2005
- No 31** "The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Reasons and Consequences of Failure and Options for Repair" by Harald Müller, August 2005
- No 32** "National Measures to Implement WMD Treaties and Norms: the Need for International Standards and Technical Assistance" by Andreas Persbo and Angela Woodward, August 2005
- No 33** "Russia and the Chemical Disarmament Process" by Sergey Oznobistchev and Alexander Saveliev, August 2005
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- No 35** "Multilateral Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Arrangements" by Harald Müller, August, 2005
- No 36** "Nuclear Threat Perceptions and Nonproliferation Responses: A Comparative Analysis" by Scott Parrish and William C. Potter, August, 2005
- No 37** "WMD Crisis: Law Instead of Lawless Self-Help" by Harald Müller, August, 2005
- No 38** "The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction" by Carol Cohn with Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, December, 2005
- No 39** "The Influence of the International Trade of Nuclear Materials and Technologies on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" by Dr Vladimir V Evseev, December, 2005
- No 40** "A Standing United Nations Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible" by Trevor Findlay, December, 2005

## Conditions for a Nuclear Free Middle East

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The goal of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East, and more generally a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East, has been repeatedly affirmed by all states involved as well as the international community at the highest political levels. Yet instead of movement towards this goal, security analysts and popular media headlines indicate a trend towards proliferation of WMD in the Middle East. Greenpeace believes that a Nuclear Free Zone is a condition for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the region and therefore is also a condition for a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East.

The Middle East remains the region with the greatest concentration of states that are not party to one or more of the international treaties dealing with WMD: the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).<sup>1</sup> Moreover and more ominously, WMD (specifically chemical weapons) have been used in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> The overwhelming majority of countries in the region have some form of WMD-related research, development or weaponisation program.<sup>3</sup>

This reality is an enormous challenge but is also the very reason that the Middle East is the region that receives the most international attention as a potential WMD free zone. Elsewhere in the world, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) have been successfully negotiated and adopted, and additional such zones are being systemically pursued. But in the Middle East the goal of a NWFZ has been linked to a WMD Free Zone in all the relevant official circles. This is because of the strategic link that states in the region have made among the various WMD,<sup>4</sup> with biological and chemical weapons perceived as the “poor man’s nukes” despite the significant difference in scale of mass destruction between nuclear weapons on the one hand and biological and chemical weapons on the other hand.

Because of the inherently dual-use nature of nuclear technology – for civilian as well as military applications – and because of the suspicion and proliferation concerns that all nuclear programs generate, Greenpeace believes that a fully Nuclear Free Zone is an essential element of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East. Such a zone will also require parallel progress on biological and chemical weapons disarmament through the existing treaties that deal with these two categories of weapons.

### Background

All the relevant players as well as the highest international security authority have affirmed the goal of a WMD free zone in the Middle East. Specifically, the United Nations Security Council,<sup>5</sup> all the member states of the NPT,<sup>6</sup> as well as Israel<sup>7</sup> have expressed support for this goal.

In addition, the call for a NWFZ in the Middle East has a history of over 30 years. In 1974 Iran, supported by Egypt, submitted a proposal toward this end to the UN General Assembly, which has since then adopted an annual resolution calling for such a zone. Since 1980 the resolution has been supported by all the states of the region and to this day it continues to be adopted annually by consensus.

In 1990 Egypt’s President Mubarak proposed expanding this concept to establish a zone free of WMD, together with a verification system. In 1991, in the context of the war in Iraq and subsequent disarmament efforts, the UN Security Council passed a resolution affirming both the goal of a NWFZ and a WMD Free Zone. In 1995, the NPT was indefinitely extended (ie, made into a permanent treaty) through an agreement among state parties that included a “Resolution on the Middle East” calling for a WMD Free Zone. In addition, this goal has been a topic of discussion at countless conferences and seminars. The rhetoric, however, is far from the reality.

## Conditions for Progress

The current deadlock on negotiations towards a WMD free zone in the Middle East is a direct result of substantively different starting positions. But they do not preclude possible interim measures that might help lay the groundwork for eventual realisation of UN resolutions, NPT commitments, and security aspects of the regional peace process.

The position of the Arab states is that Israel's nuclear capabilities are destabilizing and must be addressed as a precondition to peace and security in the region. Israel's position is that "the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual recognition and good neighborliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures"<sup>8</sup> is a precondition for establishing a NWFZ and achieving the vision of a WMD free zone. These apparently polar opposite positions are what led to the breakdown of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks within the Middle East Peace Process. But these polar opposite positions – nuclear first or Nirvana first – can be overcome if the states involved accept that everything needs to be put on the table, that it is not possible to discuss regional peace without addressing the nuclear issue, and that the nuclear issue cannot be dealt with in isolation, outside the context of a comprehensive regional solution.

For example, Recommendation 12 of the report recently concluded by the WMD Commission:<sup>9</sup>

All states should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a confidence- building measure, all states in the region, including Iran and Israel, should for a prolonged period of time commit themselves to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories.

Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other states in the Middle East in ratifying the CTBT.

The IAEA Board of Governors resolution of 4 February 2006 also points out that the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis could contribute to the realisation of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East.

Besides these important but incremental measures, however, it will also be necessary to consider the starting points of each of the representative positions of the Arab states, Iran, and Israel. In each case, internal or domestic factors are inseparable from the national security and foreign policy positions that dictate stated positions in global fora. Threat perceptions originate outside of the states involved, but within the region they are a direct contributing factor, probably the key factor, in each of the representative positions considered here. What this means for international and regional efforts to promote a WMD free zone is that the most persuasive arguments and relevant information might differ in the case of each representative position.

The Arab states are grouped together for the purposes of this discussion because they generally take a joint position in the relevant fora, but among themselves they have varying WMD-related capabilities. While a few Arab states have small nuclear research programs, none has a large-scale nuclear program that gives rise to immediate nuclear proliferation concerns. Whether this remains the situation is a crucial question, because nuclear programs *of any sort* are inherently suspect to proliferation concerns. The case of Iran proves this point, and the reactions to the recent announcement of six Arab states regarding intentions to develop nuclear energy programs further support it.<sup>10</sup> Outsiders might not be able to know whether and to what extent regional security developments factor into domestic decisions to develop a nuclear program, but that will not stop them from assuming that it is such a factor.

In the case of Iran, the positions and actions taken by international bodies to date have essentially had the reverse of the intended effect. Moreover, it is unlikely that sanctions will succeed in achieving the desired change in Iranian policy. The tools of escalation, isolation, and the threat or use of force have not historically succeeded in solving proliferation crises. However, signs of progress toward a WMD free zone in the Middle East could help to reassure Iran that its security would be better served without a uranium enrichment program that generates suspicion. In the interim, Iran could drop its linkage between the efforts of the international community to end its uranium enrichment program and its suspended implementation of transparency measures and could thereby reduce international suspicion.<sup>11</sup>

Within Israel an important internal confidence-building measure is the opening up of the nuclear issue for discussion at the domestic level, where ambiguity has become a way of life and essentially accepted as a norm by an Israeli public that has successfully been persuaded that it does not want to know. The very existence of such a discussion within the country will bring about a change of perception regarding Israel on the part of a variety of other countries. In addition, having a discussion on a matter that had previously been considered taboo would turn the nuclear issue into something that can be explored, debated, and even challenged. Except for Israeli nuclear policy, public discourse in Israel focuses extensively on regional nuclear issues. Despite this, very little or no attention is given to disarmament as a solution or as a means to reducing regional nuclear tensions.

For example, the term “disarmament” is translated into Hebrew as “weapons dismantlement”, a concept that focuses on the physical aspects of the weapons. In contrast “disarmament” is essentially an effort at change in policy. In Israel, which is extremely practiced and fluent in security issues, incorporating a reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons into the security discourse as a relevant way to pursue and achieve security will be a necessary and positive step.

In addition, a broad historical and cultural perspective that builds on the traditional ties among the peoples involved – Arabs, Jews, and Persians – as well as a willingness to consider internal domestic concerns and to engage at that level, will contribute greatly to the goal of a WMD Free Zone. These cultural and historical ties run deep, have on the whole been constructive and mutually enriching, predate the nuclear era by millennia, and have the potential to outlast it as well if seen from this angle.

Progress can also be made by tackling nuclear materials and technology concerns head on. Discussions leading to a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are a step in the right direction but they do not go far enough because the current proposals would not address existing stocks or the capability to produce weapons usable material in the future. In contrast, a model Comprehensive Fissile Materials Treaty (CFMT) has recently been proposed and informally circulated among members of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.<sup>12</sup> This approach would prohibit the separation or processing of weapons-usable plutonium as well as the production or processing of highly enriched uranium and would therefore go farther towards addressing proliferation concerns than any of the official proposals currently circulating. As an international proposal, it could cut across the current deadlock on WMD free zone negotiations in the Middle East, since each state in the region could independently entertain and engage with this proposal.

Moreover, since nuclear material and technology, and the suspicion they generate, are the source of proliferation concerns in the Middle East, then the solution lies in the alternatives. The option of exploring these alternatives is completely independent of the WMD free zone deadlock but, if pursued in parallel, could help pave the way for progress on negotiations by demonstrating the attractiveness of alternatives. The key alternative lies in the option of renewable energy sources and the vision of a Nuclear Free Middle East.

Exploitation of the considerable potential for renewable energy development in the Middle East can provide an alternative to nuclear energy plans recently announced by a number of Middle Eastern governments, including Egypt, with its associated financial, environmental, human health and of course proliferation consequences. *A Pathway to a Sustainable and Clean Energy Future for the Middle East* recently published by Greenpeace<sup>13</sup> demonstrates that a combination of renewable energy sources,

energy efficiency and decentralised energy could transform the Middle East energy sector, increasing security, reducing future energy prices and accelerating development, not to mention freeing the region from the threat posed by dual use nuclear technology. From an environmental and economic point of view, renewable energy sources are an option well worth exploring, and from a non-proliferation point of view they would make a decidedly positive contribution to security in the region.

Finally, given the political link among WMD in the Middle East, progress is needed on all three fronts – nuclear, chemical, and biological – in order to further the goal of a WMD free zone in the region. Progress towards the universalisation and implementation of the BWC and CWC, in parallel with national level measures to address nuclear proliferation concerns, is needed.

## Conclusions

For many observers around the world the Middle East has become synonymous with war and conflict, and for those concerned with WMD proliferation it is a “hot spot.” For those living in the region, the reality of war and the fear of mass destruction are all too real. But the Middle East is more than that. Its potential for growth and positive change and for making lasting contributions to the rest of the world is also part of the history and identity of the people who live here. For these reasons passions run deep in the Middle East and the world watches with more than a little trepidation to see how the nuclear era will play itself out in this famously volatile region.

There are those who believe that civilisation began in the Middle East, and there are those who believe that it will end here. The former perspective does an injustice to the rest of the world, and the latter does an injustice to the Middle East. By looking beyond narrow national interests, which reflect only a snapshot of Middle Eastern history, the people of this region can make another lasting contribution to global civilisation if they succeed in achieving the first negotiated WMD free zone. A Nuclear Free Middle East will be a necessary element of this goal, and as challenging as that step appears today, stranger things have happened in this part of the world.

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<sup>1</sup> *Building a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East: Global Non-Proliferation Regimes and Regional Experiences*, UNIDIR/2004/24, pp. 25, 29. See also Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East* (updated 29 September 2006) <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Reported Use of Chemical Weapons, Ballistic Missiles, and Cruise Missiles in the Middle East*, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/timeline.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Center for Nonproliferation Studies, *Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities in the Middle East*, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/capable.htm>

<sup>4</sup> Alan Dowty, “Making ‘No First Use’ Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent,” *The Non-proliferation Review* 8 (Spring 2001): 79-85.

<sup>5</sup> Security Council Resolution 687 (3 April 1991).

<sup>6</sup> NPT 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Note: NPT member States include ALL countries except India, Israel and Pakistan. North Korea has since announced its withdrawal (although not accepted by NPT member states) but in 1995 was a member of the NPT.

<sup>7</sup> State of Israel, *Explanation of Vote on the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East*, UN General Assembly First Committee, 23 October 2006. This is the most recent statement of Israel’s position: “Israel remains committed to a vision of the Middle East developing into a zone free of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.” Available at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com06/res/eov1israeloct23.doc>

<sup>8</sup> Israel, *Explanation of Vote on the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East*, UN General Assembly First Committee, 23 October 2006, above.

<sup>9</sup> *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*, WMD Commission, 2006, [www.wmdcommission.org](http://www.wmdcommission.org)

<sup>10</sup> See Dominic Moran, “Egypt goes nuclear amid regional tensions” *International Relations and Security Network* <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=16724>, and Richard Beeston, “Six Arab states join rush to go nuclear” *The Times*, 4 November 2006, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,251-2436948,00.html>

<sup>11</sup> Wade Boese, “Preventing Nuclear Disaster” 25 March 2006 [http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060325\\_Boese\\_NuclearDisaster.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20060325_Boese_NuclearDisaster.asp)

<sup>12</sup> *Comprehensive Fissile Materials Treaty*, 21 February 2006 <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/comprehensive-fissile-material>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.greenpeace.org/mediterranean/news/introduction-to-the-mideast-energy-scenario>

## Appendix L

# WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO BE DOING DIFFERENTLY

**Shirin Ershadi**

I too believe that the international community should engage in structurally building peace and educating people about the roots of conflict. At the same time I believe that those who violate human rights and basic rights of people should be held accountable and brought to justice. After World War Two the international community determined that justice would not be served if perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity were not held responsible for their actions. Approximately 60 years later, the International Criminal Court was formed.

At the time when the law governing the International Criminal Court, called the Rome Statute, was being written, the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice lobbied to include provisions in the law on investigation and prosecution of gender crimes. As a result of the efforts of the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice, for the first time in history, gender crimes that had been historically omitted or disregarded were codified and recognized by an international treaty as war crimes and crimes against humanity. In addition two very specific crimes consisting of persecution on the grounds of gender and enslavement were added to the previously recognized crimes against humanity.

The Rome Statute is one of the first laws to reflect gender equality in areas where women have been disadvantaged in the past, like sexual assaults, forced pregnancies, forced sterilizations, gender persecution, trafficking and enslavement. Unlike other laws that have generally been defined and implemented in a male-dominated space, the Rome Statute has been drafted with regard to the interests and concerns of women. Gender crimes have been defined carefully in order to include most atrocities against women. Now that the International Criminal Court exists and is functioning, it is important to ensure that women's voices, all women's voices, are heard in the implementation of the statute by the court.

Unfortunately, during history, laws have served the interests of men in opposition to the interests of women, and women have not been able to gain genuine equality.

In some legal systems submissiveness of women to men is expressly stated in laws, and control over women's bodies is recognized as a right of men. Such laws have to be radically reshaped to address women's concerns.

Some countries have adopted laws exempting perpetrators of the crime of killing or physically attacking women who engage in out-of-wedlock sexual relations on the basis of the excuse that such criminal acts are honor killings. The glorification of the act of killing or severely harming women in the name of reputation is a good example of how patriarchal understandings have been used to justify control over women through an act which has roots in culture, tradition and concepts of masculinity. Such concepts of masculinity, also referred to as patriarchy, have in many instances resulted in the idea of ownership of women and their lives. Instead of accepting women as full human beings, entitled to freedoms equal to those of men, patriarchs have manipulated and controlled women, preventing them from pursuing their interests and preferences in life by exercising power over them. Power has not only been exercised through physical means, for men's physical strength may diminish as they age. Power has been passed through generations through writings, traditions and interpretation of religious texts. A few unfortunate examples are as follows: In November of 2005, in the village of Multan in Pakistan, Nazir Ahmed slit the throats of his three young daughters and their 25-year-old stepsister to salvage his family's honor. While speaking to the Associated Press in police detention, he regretted that he had not killed the stepsister's alleged lover (Associated Press, 2005).

Ahmed's killing spree was witnessed by his wife, Rehmat Bibi, as she cradled their 3-month-old baby son on a Friday night at their home in the village of Gago Mandi in Eastern Punjab province. Bibi begged Ahmed to spare the lives of her daughters, Banoo, 8, Sumaira, 7, and Humaria, 4, but was told that if she made a noise he would kill her too (Associated Press, 2005).

He told the Associated Press at the police station that he bought a butcher's knife and a machete after midday prayers on Friday and hid them in the house where he carried out the killings. In justifying his murders, Ahmed told the Associated Press (2005), "I thought the younger girls would do what their sister had done, so they should be eliminated. We are poor people and we have nothing else to protect but our honor."

Pursuant to a report of the Human Rights Commission, this was the latest in 260 such honor killings documented by the Commission during the last 11 months of 2005.

Why would Ahmed think that he has the right to terminate the lives of four other human beings? Does Ahmed believe that he

owns his daughters like he owns property of some sort? What is the source of his belief?

In late November of 2002, Semse Allak was stoned in Mardin, Turkey. After spending seven months in a coma, she died in June 2003. Leyala Pervizat, a feminist activist working with KA-MER engaged in preventing honor killings in Turkey, took issue and challenged the religious leaders of Urfa, one of the most religious and conservative cities in Turkey, stating that the Quran does not permit women to be treated as such. In response, one Muslim religious leader stated, "This is honor, what has it got to do with the Quran? Men's honor comes before the Book" (Carnegie Council).

In August of 2002, Amina Lawal, a 30-year-old Nigerian woman, was convicted to death by stoning for an extramarital sexual relationship, which happened in Nigeria. Since Amina had become pregnant, the enforcement of the sentence was deferred until her child was born. The religious extremists in Nigeria regarded the sentence prescribed for Amina a victory of the Sharia Law. The three cases discussed hereinabove are extreme interpretations of old traditions, cultural viewpoints or religious beliefs. The Turkish man who believes that his reputation has been tarnished regards reputation superior to his religious beliefs, whereas the extremists in Nigeria regard the sentence prescribed for Amina a victory of the Sharia Law. While equality of men and women has been referred to in many Quranic verses, such verses are not viewed from the same perspective by everyone. According to the Muslim Women's League, "The prevailing view that devalues and belittles women is derived from socio-cultural factors that are derived by a distorted and erroneous interpretation of their religion" (Carnegie Council).

In an essay written on Imam Ali by George Jordagh (1982: 496), he quotes from the Imam: "Don't coerce your offsprings to follow your way of life, for they are born in an age other than yours."

Although this saying has been quoted in several Islamic countries, it is not used as a basis for a broad interpretation of religion. If it is used, the practice of old traditions that contradict universally recognized principles of human rights should be banned and discredited. Unfortunately, not only are such traditions not banned, but some legal systems have codified and included them as acceptable practices into their laws in order to give them more legitimacy and ensure their enforcement.

Laws of Iran, Palestine and Jordan on honor killings are a good example of codification and legitimization of such traditions. These laws are in direct contradiction to Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Rome Statute.

Pursuant to the Islamic Criminal Code of Iran (Section 630), "If a man finds his wife in adultery with another man with knowledge that his wife is voluntarily committing adultery, he can kill both the wife and the other man, unless his wife is participating in the act with duress, in which case he can kill the other man."

This right has been recognized in the Islamic Criminal Law of Iran only for men. Women who find their husbands committing adultery do not have the right to kill the husband or even request divorce. But men have the right to kill their wives if they find them in extramarital sexual relations.

Pursuant to Section 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code, which is the code also applied in the West Bank, "He who surprises his wife or one of his [female] *mahrams* committing adultery with somebody [*flagrant delicto*] and kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, shall be exempt from liability [*udhr muhill*: literally, 'shall benefit from the exculpating excuse']" (Shalhoub-Kevorkian: 580). In both the Iranian and Jordanian law, only males can benefit from the provisions of such codes. Women are not granted the right to kill or even harm their male relatives or spouse if they find them in adultery. The difference between the two laws is that the Iranian law expressly recognizes the right to kill, endorsing the act of murder as a right, whereas the Jordanian law provides exemption from punishment or reduction of the time to be served. Unfortunately, in both societies, female victims are blamed for the act that instigated the killing instead of the perpetrator of the crime.

In either case this inhumane and uncivilized act not only is in violation of CEDAW, which implicates the full development and advancement of women for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men, but is in violation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute and therefore a crime against humanity of murder and persecution.

CEDAW was signed and ratified by the Iranian parliament, but on August 17, 2003, the Guardian Council in Iran found it in contradiction with Islamic values (IRTV, 2003: 1). As a result the Islamic Republic of Iran is not bound by the provisions of CEDAW. The Treaty of the Rome Statute has been signed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, but has not been ratified by the Iranian parliament yet. Jordan has both signed and ratified the Rome Statute.

General principles of international law and the principal legal systems of the world condemn murder. No human being has the right to kill any other human being except in the form of capital punishment provided by law. In a number of European countries capital punishment is also prohibited even in cases of murder. Besides, in today's world the right to take the law into one's own hands and

apply punishments privately has come to an end. Legal systems have been erected in almost all societies, and punishments cannot be carried out unless and until a court of law determines so.

Recognition of the right to kill one's wife or other female relatives is not acceptable in any manner, shape or form. Non-observance of religious beliefs or ethical values by a woman is not a crime and does not justify murder. Murder of one's wife or other female relatives for non-observance of ethical values is not a justifiable murder and cannot be exempt from punishment. The right to kill one's wife or other female relatives is contradictory to CEDAW and an express violation of Article 7 of the Rome Statute.

Pursuant to CEDAW (1979: part 1, article 1), the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any "distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field."

Article 630 of the Iranian Criminal Code and Article 340 of the Jordanian Criminal Code do not provide for exercise of human rights irrespective of women's marital status and on the basis of equality with men. Therefore, both articles are in express violation of CEDAW.

Article 630 is also in express violation of the Rome Statute. Crimes against humanity are the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, that require conduct which is impermissible under generally applicable international law as recognized by the principal legal systems of the world (Dixon, Kahn, and May, 2003: 365).

Principal legal systems of the world do not provide husbands with the right to kill their wives or other female relatives on the basis of disloyalty or other conduct.

The right to kill one's wife or other female relatives, recognized in the legal systems of some countries, constitutes a systematic and widespread attack against women, which is not only a crime against humanity of murder, but also results in a constant fear in women of being killed or harmed by male relatives. Women who live in countries where such acts have been decriminalized are afraid for their lives at all times. The constant fear of being killed or harmed constitutes a systematic and widespread attack in the form of persecution of women, which is also recognized as a crime against humanity of persecution in the Rome Statute. Such crimes and other inhumane acts described in the Rome Statute apply to the right to kill or harm female relatives and are all punishable at the International Criminal Court.

By accepting the Rome Statute and encouraging its ratification worldwide, the international community will not tolerate misogynistic laws, specifically honor killings. Countries that have legalized such forms of persecution and murder will be convinced to amend their laws in compliance with the internationally recognized principles of human rights. Whereas the International Criminal Court tries and sentences individuals who commit crimes, parliamentarians and other lawmakers who insist on enforcement of misogynistic laws may face prosecution and criminal punishment.

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## Appendix M

# INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCESS CONFERENCE PHOTOGRAPHER JUDY RAND'S PHOTOS

NWI has uploaded many of Judy Rand's photos from the conference to our online photo gallery. You can view the gallery at <http://www.nobelwomensinitiative.org/gallery/>.

To view conference photos, click the "Events" button. Then click "NWI Conference - Galway Ireland - May 2007." Judy's photos are in the "Photos by Judy Rand" folder. To download one of Judy's photos, click on the thumbnail of the image. You will be directed to a page with a larger version of the selected image. Once there, right click the image and select "save image as." You are welcome to save any of Judy's images.

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You can also order prints of Judy's photographs by visiting [www.printroom.com/pro/jrand](http://www.printroom.com/pro/jrand). Select the "Nobel Women's Initiative - Galway" link under "Galleries" at the bottom of the page. You will be prompted to enter a password. The password is "peace."

Thanks again, Judy, for the wonderful images and for your generosity in sharing them with us!



